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Prescriptions As An Extension of the
Doctor-Patient Relationship
A WOMAN HAS BEEN TAKING "THE PILL" for three years under
her doctor's prescription although she has not seen her doctor
in ten months. A professor has a renewable prescription for his heart
condition, but has not seen that physician for more than a year. A
stroke victim has been taking a prescription pain killer for seven
months beyond the time when he was last examined by his physician.
Does the doctor-patient relationship exist in situations such as these?
Whether or not a doctor-patient relationship exists can be sig-
nificant in applying the statute of limitations to medical malpractice
cases. The significance is apparent when one realizes that Ohio
follows what is known as the termination rule1 as to when a cause
of action for medical malpractice accrues. The termination rule says,
in effect, that the statute of limitations for medical malpractice
actions2 does not begin to run until the doctor-patient relationship
is terminated.3
The issue of whether or not the doctor-patient relationship exists
is normally an issue of fact.4 However, in Millbaugh v. Gilmore,' the
Ohio Supreme Court recently held that the taking of pills prescribed
by a patient after the patient failed to show up for an appointment
was not a continuation of the relationship, and that the minds of
reasonable men could not differ as to that conclusion of fact. In
effect, the Ohio Supreme Court overturned a jury conclusion that the
taking of pills prescribed by a doctor did continue the doctor-patient
relationship.6
The decision in Millbaugh v. Gilmorye raises a number of inter-
esting questions. To what extent does the taking of a prescription by
a person evidence a doctor-patient relationship? Should the taking
of a prescription raise a presumption as to the existence of that
relationship? Could it properly be said that the taking of a prescrip-
tion does, as a matter of law, extend the relationship? In considering
' Wyler v. Tripi, 25 Ohio St.2d 164, 168, 267 N.E.2d 419, 421 (1971).
20HIO REV. CODE §2305.11 (Page 1972) states that an action for malpractice shall be
brought within one year after the cause of action accrues.
Wyier v. Tripi, 25 Ohio St.2d 164, 167, 267 NE.2d 419, 421 (1971).
4 Hankerson v. Thomas, 148 A.2d 583, 584 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1959).
s30 Ohio St.2d 319, 285 N.E.2d 19 (1972).
OId. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed a 2-1 decision of the appellate court which had ruled
as error the trial court's granting of defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the
jury's 9-3 verdict for the plaintif-patient.
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these questions it will be helpful to develop a definition of prescrip-
tions and to consider the nature of the prescribing process, to con-
sider the nature of the doctor-patient relationship, and to consider
the development and policy considerations of the termination rule.
Prescription of Drugs by the Medical Profession
It is important to differentiate between "over-the-counter drugs"
and "prescription drugs." Although a physician may order the use
of either,t the latter can only be obtained with a prescription. It
should also be noted that prescriptions are not limited to drugs;
various devices may also require a prescription in order to be ob-
tained.9 As used throughout this article the term "prescription" will
refer to a prescription drug and not to devices or over-the-counter
drugs.
The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 0 specifies which
drugs shipped in interstate commerce must be dispensed only on pre-
scription." Such drugs include (1) habit forming drugs,12 (2) drugs
that for various reasons are not safe for use except under the super-
vision of a licensed practitioner, 3 and (3) a new drug1 4 which, be-
cause its effects are not completely known,'5 must be dispensed only
upon the prescription of a licensed practitioner. Such is the defini-
tion of a prescription drug according to federal legislation. Since state
legislation dealing with food and drugs is generally a mirror image
of the federal act,1 the definition of a prescription drug discussed
above would, as a general proposition, not be altered significantly
by state laws.17
For the most part, a physician or surgeon is free to prescribe a
prescription drug of any type and for any duration as is consistent
with his professional judgment so long as the prescription is to a
8OHIO R ev. CODE §4729.02 (Page 1972).
Eg., a diaphragm requires a prescription in order to be obtained.
1"21 U.S.C. §301 et. seq. (1972).
"1 Id. §353(b) (1) (1972).
"Id. §353(b) (1) (A) (1972).
1 21 U.S.C. §353(b) (1) (B) (1972) states the drug requires supervision because of its
toxicity or other potentiality for harm, method of use, or because of the collateral mea-sures
necessary for its use.
14 See 21 U.S.C. §3 2 1 (p) (1972) for a definition of new drug.
Is See HEW TASK FORCE ON PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: THE DRUG PRESCRIBERS, December
1968, at 3 [hereinafter cited as THE DRUG PRESCRIBERS], which discusses the difficulty in
determining from pre-clinical investigation the side effects caused by drug allergy, intoler-
ance, and drug interaction.
16 MORRIs, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAw 86 (5th ed. 1971); compare, e.g., OHIO
REv. CODE §3715.01 et seq, (Page 1972) with the federal act.
"1 Interview with Paul A. Lichtman, practicing community pharmacist, in Cleveland, Ohio,
February, 1973.
[Vol. 22:549
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol22/iss3/10
1973] PRESCRIPTIONS DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP 551
patient for medical purposes.18 A physician does, of course, have cer-
tain guidelines regarding his prescribing practices. All medical schools
offer training in drug therapy, often in the early part of the cur-
riculum.19 The practicing physician relies primarily upon this train-
ing in medical school, upon numerous medical journals, upon the
personal exchange of information wiLh his colleagues, and upon his
own experience, in determining the types and dosages of drugs to
prescribe to his patients.2 The drug manufacturers also provide cer-
tain guidelines in accordance with federal regulations. These regula-
tions require that the drug package include information as to the
drug's ingredients, effects, dosages, routes and methods of adminis-
tration, frequency and duration of administration, and any relevant
hazards, side effects, and precautions under which the drug can be
safely used.21
There are, however, a few restrictions or limitations upon a
physician or surgeon's discretion. Federal law, for instance, provides
some restriction upon the duration of the use of a prescription for
drugs which may be abused, and upon the number of refills that may
be obtained before a renewal by the physician is required. 22 Other re-
strictions deal exclusively with narcotics.23 The medical profession
itself has adopted certain restrictions upon the use of drugs in ex-
perimentation. 4 In spite of the relatively liberal attitude toword pre-
scription practices existing today, some practitioners expect (or fear)
an increase in the amount of control exercised over the medical pro-
fession in the general area of prescribing.
Is Interview with Algis Maulionis, M.D., Senior Obstetrician-Gynecologist, Kaiser Commu-
nity Health Foundation, Cleveland, Ohio, in Cleveland, February, 1973 [hereinafter cited
as Dr. Matulionis Interview].
"THE DRUG PRESCRIBERS, supra note 15, at 6.
10 Dr. Matlionis Interview, supra note 18.
2121 C.F.R. §1.106(b) (1972).
= 21 U.S.C. §829 (1972) provides that a prescription for narcotics may not be refilled. Fur-
thermore, prescriptions for amphetamines or barbiturates may not be refilled more than
five times unless renewed, nor may they be filled or refilled more than six months after the
prescription date. See HEW TASK FORCE ON PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: THE DRUG MAKERS
AND THE DRUG DISTRIBUTORS 80 (1968) for a brief general discussion of various state
and federal regulations on prescriptions.
'See Bellizzi, Legal Prescription of Narcotics, 70 N.Y. J. MEDICINE 1677 (1970).
2AInterview with R. Crawford Morris, author of the book DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE
LAW (5th ed. 1971), in Cleveland, Ohio, February 20, 1973 [hereinafter cited as R. Morris
Interview]. See THE INSTITUTIONAL GUIDE TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCA-
TION AND WELFARE POLICY ON PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS, DHEW PUB. No.
(NIH) 72-102 (1971).
"sSee Smith, Drugs and the Physieian-Patient Relationship, 66 J. KENTUCKY MED. ASSOC,
1062 (1968); Prescription Integrity Endangered, 66 J. INDIANA STATE MED. AssOc. 131
(1971).
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Although the standard of medical care in the United States is
highly praised by many, drug prescribing does have some problem
areas which will be mentioned in passing. The drug therapy curriculum
in medical schools is to some extent inadequate since much of what
is taught is outdated by the time a medical student graduates. 6 The
rapid developments in the drug industry make it increasingly difficult
for a physician to keep current in pharmacology during his profes-
sional career. 7 There are enormous time pressures 28 upon a practi-
tioner which may contribute to his overenthusiastic response to the
marketing efforts of the drug industry.2 Extensive medical insurance
coverage for the patient also reduces his personal concern over the
cost and extent of medication. 30 As a result it has been said:
[T] he average doctor tends to overprescribe; he orders
unnecessary medicines, the wrong medicines, and too many
medicines for the same illness, and he is too easily persuaded
to change to the latest product.31
Doctor- Patient Relationship
The doctor-patient relationship32 is founded upon the realization
that the physician is skilled and experienced in afflictions of the body
while the patient ordinarily knows very little about such matters. 3
Because of this special skill and experience in diagnosis and treat-
ment, the patient will seek out and obtain treatment from the physi-
cian. 4 This contemplation of treatment is said to be an essential
ingredient of the doctor-patient relationship.35 Thus, the existence of
the relationship and the existence or contemplation of treatment is
a near identity.3 6 The doctor-patient relationship has been further
described as a relationship of trust and confidence, 37 based upon mutual
6 THE DRUG PRESCRIBERS, sapra note 15, at 6.
Ild. at 5.
2Muller, The Overmedicated Society: Forces in the Marketplace for Medical Care, 176
SCIENCE 489 (1972).
29Id. at 490.
5Id. at 491.
31 THE DRUG PRESCRIBERS, supra note 15, at 5; see Maronde, A Study of Prescribing Patteros,
9 MEDICAL CARE 383 (1971).
32See MORRIS, supra note 16, ch. 8, for a good general discussion of the doctor-patient
relationship.
3 Adams v. Isom, 249 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952).
34Tvedt v. Haugen, 70 N.D. 338, 294 N.W. 183 (1940).
"5 Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Bergerson, 25 F.2d 680, 683 (8th Cir. 1928); MORRIS, supra note 16,
at 135.
32 See D. LoUISELL, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 376 (1969) [hereinafter cited as LOUISELL].
37 Hummel v. State, 210 Ark. 471, 196 S.W.2d 594 (1946); Macaulay v. Booth, 53 Cal.
App.2d 757, 128 P.2d 386 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 1942).
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consent, 8 under which the physician has the duty to exercise utmost
good faith.39 The relationship is said to arise out of contract, express
or implied.4
Once the doctor-patient relationship is initiated, it may be ter-
minated in various ways. Mutual consent of the parties may end the
relationship;4 the patient's recovery from his ailment or from the
effects of treatment may end the relationship ;" the authorized re-
ferral of the case to another physician may end the relationship;43
when the patient is given adequate notice, the withdrawal of the
physician may end the relationship;44 an express or implied dismissal
of the physician may revoke the relationship. 45 There is seldom any
formality in the severance of the doctor-patient relationship 46 except
where there has been an express referral, an express dismissal, or
a formal notice of withdrawal.
Because the relation often ends without formality, it can be
difficult to determine exactly when the relationship has ended, as is
evidenced by numerous cases. In Meyers v. Clarkin, after setting
a fractured leg the doctor often called on the patient at home, but
he only observed the patient walk on crutches. The jury found that
the contractual relationship was extended by these calls and the ap-
pellate court held that the issue was properly submitted to a jury.8
In Pump v. Fox," after an operation on the patient and after retire-
ment from active practice as a physician, a doctor continued to ad-
vise the patient of other doctors she should visit. On one occasion the
doctor even agreed to pay a surgical fee for the patient. The appel-
late court held that a jury should decide whether or not the relation-
ship had terminated." Netzel v. Toddf1 deals with prescriptions in
particular. In that case a patient continued taking pills under the
prescription of a surgeon. The appellate court held that it was error
38Tved v. Haugen, 70 N.D. 338, 294 N.W. 183 (1940).
39 Batty v. Arizona State Dental Board, 57 Ariz. 239, 112 P.2d 870 (1941); Foster v. Brady.
198 Wash. 13, 86 P.2d 760 (1939).
41 McNamera v. Emmons, 36 Cal. App.2d 199, 97 P.2d 503 (4th Dist. Ct. App, 1939),
41Capps v. Volk, 189 Kan. 287, 369 P.2d 238 (1962).
42 LOUISELL, supra note 36, at 377.
43Id.
44 MORRIS, snpra note 16, at 135.
45 Capps v. Volk, 189 Kan. 287, 369 1.2d 238 (1962).
46 Schmit v. Esser, 183 Minn. 354, 236 N.W. 622 (1931).
"33 Ohio App. 165, 168 N.E. 771 (1929).
aId. at 170, 168 N.E. at 772.
0113 Ohio App. 150, 177 N.E.2d 520 (1961).
501d. at 156, 177 N.E.2d at 525.
"124 Ohio App. 219, 157 N.E. 405 (1926).
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for the trial court to rule as a matter of law that the'cause of action
was barred by the statute of limitations.2 In very explicit language
the appellate court stated:
[i]t is certain ... that the relation of surgeon and pa-
tient existed from the time the defendant sent the pills in
January, 1923, until the last one was taken under the de-
fendant's instructions on August 8th of that year . . .3
In contrast to the Netzel decision is the recent Ohio Supreme Court
decision in Millbaugh v. Gilmore"t which has been already discussed.
Statute of Limitations - Termination Rule
It is generally said that under the termination rule, the statute
of limitations for medical malpractice begins to run when the treat-
ment for a particular injury or malady is ended." Because of the
near identity of a "course of treatment" and the "doctor-patient
relationship" discussed above, the termination rule can also be
phrased in terms of the cessation of the doctor-patient relationship
as to a particular injury or malady. Ohio courts have used the ex-
press language of "doctor-patient relationship" in applying the ter-
mination rule,56 although it has been suggested that Ohio, in fact,
uses the termination of treatment concept. 57
The termination rule was first set forth in Gillette v. TuekerM
where the patient underwent an operation for appendicitis in No-
vember, 1897. Although pus was discharging from the incision, the
patient was released from the hospital one month later upon the
surgeon's explanation that the discharge was from a kangaroo tendon 59
that would soon be absorbed. The discharge continued during the
foUowing months while the patient was still under the care of the
doctor. Finally, approximately one year after the operation, the pa-
tient visited the surgeon and suggested that he had not performed
the surgical procedure correctly. The surgeon responded by ordering
the patient out of his office, saying that he would do no more for the
patient. A few months later a different surgeon reopened the old
52id. at 224, 157 N.E. at 406.
5 Id- at 223, 157 N.E. at 406.
130 Ohio St.2d 319, 285 NXE.2d 19 (1972).
s1 Schmit v. Esser, 183 Minn. 354, 236 N.W. 622 (1931);' 61 AM. JUR.2d Physicians and
Surgeons §185 (1972).
s' Millbaugh v. Gilmore, 30 Ohio St.2d 319, 285 N.E.2d 19 (1972); Wyler v. Tripi, 25 Ohio
St.2d 164, 267 N.E.2d 419 (1971); Delong v. Campbell, 157 Ohio St. 22, 104 N.E.2d 177
(1952); Bowers v. Santee, 99 Ohio St. 361, 124 N.E. 238 (1919); Gillette v. Tucker, 67
Ohio St. 106,65 N.E. 865 (1902).
5R. Morris Interview, spra note 24; LOUISLL, mupra note 36, at 378.
m67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902).
19 A suture obtained from a tendon in the tail of a kangaroo.
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incision and removed a two inch by three inch cheesecloth sponge.
The action for malpractice was commenced over nineteen months
after the operation, but only seven months after the last visit with
the defendant surgeon." After a directed verdict for the surgeon on
the ground that the action was barred by the one year statute of limi-
tations, the circuit court of appeals reversed. 1 Relying in part upon
the authority of a case dealing with the unskilled gelding of a colt
by a veterinary surgeons2 and in the face of a vigorous dissent,63 an
equally divided Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the cir-
cuit court, saying:
[T] he facts in the case at bar show a continuous obliga-
tion upon the [surgeon], so long as the relationship ... con-
tinued, and each day's failure to remove the sponge was a
fresh breach of the contract implied by the law.Y
Subsequent Ohio cases affirmed the application of the termination
rule,5 and other jurisdictions have adopted or commented favorably
on the rule.6
The termination rule is based in part upon the theory that the
physician or surgeon is liable for continuing negligence in not dis-
covering and repairing the damage he had done; such negligence is
a continuing breach of the physician's warranty to properly care for
the patient during the contractual relationship.67 Furthermore, since
the statute of limitations does not run during the continuance of the
relationship, a patient may rely upon the skill and judgment of his
physician without penalty. Consequently, the termination rule is
also said to strengthen the doctor-patient relationship by encourag-
60Id. at 125, 65 N.E. at 869.
61 Gillette v. Tucker, 22 Ohio C.C.R. 664 (1901).
62 Williams v. Gilman, 71 Me. 21 (1880).
63Gillette v, Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 144, 65 N.E. 865, 875 (1902), where the dissenting
opininn of Justice Davis reads in part "(t~he theory involved in the misleading phrases 'a
continuing negligence', 'a continuing wrong' . . . 'a continuous contract' is not only contrary
to all authority, but from my point of view it is utterly absurd when tested in the light of
established principles."
Id. at 133, 65 N.E. at 872.
65 Millbaugh v. Gilmore, 30 Ohio St.2d 319, 285 N.E.2d 19 ( 1972); Wyler v. Tripi, 25 Ohio
St.2d 164, 267 N.E.2d 419 (1972); DeLong v. Campbell, 157 Ohio St. 22, 104 N.E.2d 177
(1952); Bowers v. Santee, 99 Ohio St. 361, 124 N.E. 238 (1919); see Lundberg v. Bay View
Hospital, 175 Ohio St. 133, 191 N.E.2d 821 (1963), where the termination rule was ex-
tended to encompass the hospital-patient relationship; bwt see, Melsyk v. Cleveland Clinic,
32 Ohio St.2d 198, 290 N.E.2d 916 (1972), where the discovery rule was used when a
foreign body was left in the patient during surgery; Cook v. Yaker, 13 Ohio App.2d 1, 233
N.E.2d 326 (1968), where the discovery rule was used in a malpractice action against a
dentist; Stewart v. Sacks, 27 Ohio Misc- 29, 266 N.E.2d 262 (Cuyahoga County C.P. 1971),
where the discovery rule was used in a negligence action against a hospital (not a mal-
practice action, since a hospital cannot practice medicine),
66See, e.g., Schmit v. Esser, 178 Minn. 72, 266 N.W. 196 (1929).
6T DeLong v. Campbell, 157 Ohio St. 22, 25, 104 N.E.2d 177, 178 (1952).
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ing the patient to have confidence in his physician. 68 Other policy
considerations become apparent upon a further examination of the
termination rule and other rules regarding the statute of limitations.
The termination rule is designed to avoid the harsh results of
the general rule that a cause of action accrues at the time the neg-
ligent act was committed.9 Under the general rule, where no injury
is apparent at the time of the negligent act, the injured party's right
to recovery can be barred by the statute of limitations before he is
aware of any injury. It was just such a harsh result that was
avoided in Gillette v. Tucker." However, where the injury is one of
long development and has not become apparent when the doctor-
patient relationship is finally terminated, the termination rule offers
no more relief than the general rule. Consequently, the termination
rule is criticized for bearing no relationship to the injury incurred."
Many jurisdictions have gone much further than the termina-
tion rule by adopting the discovery rule which says that the statute
of limitations for medical malpractice begins to run when the result-
ing damage is discovered or should have been discovered.74 Both the
termination rule and the discovery rule represent attempts of various
jurisdictions to resolve conflicting public policies: the policy of dis-
couraging stale claims and discouraging "sitting on rights," versus
the policy of allowing meritorious claimants their day in court.7 5
Prescriptions as a Presumption of the Doctor-Patient Relationship
There is at least one theoretical argument for not extending the
doctor-patient relationship through the period when the prescription
drug is being used. However, a synthesis of the above discussions on
prescriptions, the doctor-patient relationship, and the termination
rule, provides numerous arguments supporting the following prop-
osition: the taking of a prescription drug should create a presump-
tion that the doctor-patient relationship is continued.
The argument against such a continuance is that such an ex-
tension is inconsistent with the continuing negligence theory upon
which the termination rule is based. It has been shown that under
6 Wyler v. Tripi, 25 Ohio St.2d 164, 167, 267 N.E.2d 419, 421 (1972).
691d. at 168, 267 N.E.2d at 421.
70 Id.
7167 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902).
72See Loeb, Medical Malpractice Statute of Linitation Begins to Run When tbe Pa;ient
Discovers He Has Been Injured, 30 OHIO Sr.L.J. 425, 430 (1969).
73See Wyler v. Tipi, 25 Ohio St.2d 164, 176, 267 N.E.2d 419, 422 (1971), for a recent
listing of jurisdictions adopting the discovery rule.
4 Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hospital, 50 Hawaii 150, 154, 433 P.2d 220, 223 (1967); see 61 AM
JuR.2d Physicians and Surgeons §183 (1972).
71 Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hospital, 50 Hawaii 150, 154, 433 P.2d 220, 223 (1967); Wyler v. Tripi,
25 Ohio St.2d 164, 166, 267 N.E.2d 419, 420 (1971); Annot., 80 AL.R.2d 371 (1961).
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the continuing negligence theory, the physician is said to be continu-
ously negligent for not discovering and correcting his original act
of malpractice. 76 However, a physician has no opportunity to discover
or correct his original act when the patient takes a prescription drug
in isolation from the physician. There is an inconsistency in stating
that failure to discover and correct is negligence when, in fact, there
was no opportunity to discover and correct. Although this argument
appears sound, it should be noted that the theory used as general
support for the termination rule already has no application in many
specific cases because the continuing negligence is not an element of
malpractice action." Even without prescriptions as an extension of
the relationship, it appears that the termination rule could apply
where continuing negligence was impossible because there was ab-
solutely no manifestitation of the malpractice act during the doctor-
patient relationship.
In contrast, one argument supporting the proposition that a pre-
sumption should exist relates to the very definition of a prescription
drug. Implicit in that definition is the existence of some continuing
moral or legal responsibility of a physician to the user of a prescrip-
tion drug. Regarding habit forming drugs, there seems an implicit
responsibility to monitor the user and to guard against addiction;
regarding the second category of prescription drugs (unsafe without
supervision), there seems an implicit responsibility to provide that
continuing supervision; regarding new drugs, there seems the im-
plicit responsibility to monitor the use and to be on guard for un-
known effects. There is evidence of the need for such a continuing
responsibility,"8 and there is dicta supporting the existence of such a
continuing responsibility This continuing responsibility, be it legal
or moral, is indicative of a continuing doctor-patient relationship.
A second argument for the existence of a presumption relates
to the public policy of giving an injured party his day in court.
Allowing the presumption is, in effect, a moderate liberalization of
the termination rule. Under such a liberalization, the statute of limi-
tations would be less likely to bar a meritorious cause of action in
some instances. Such an extension would not, however, allow an in-
jured party additional time to "sit on his rights" because the termi-
nation rule includes an exception - where the patient learns of
76DeLong v. Campbell, 157 Ohio St. 22, 25, 104 N.E.2d 177, 178 (1952).
7'Sae 42 OHIO JUR.2d Physicians and Svrgeons §147 (1960).
"
8 See THE DRUG PRESCRIBERS, supra note 15, at 5.
79 Fleishman v. RichardSon-Merrell Inc., 94 N.J. Super. 90, 226 A.2d 843 (1967) (dictum).
557
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malpractice prior to termination of treatment. In such a case the
statute of limitations begins to run when the patient becomes aware
of the negligence'
The need to clearly identify the physician with the whole area
of drug prescribing also supports this presumption. Some problem
areas in drug prescribing, such as the medical school curriculum, the
inherent danger existing in any drug, difficulties in keeping abreast
of changes in the pharmaceutical industry, and overprescribing, have
already been mentioned. In light of these problems and in light of
the physician's freedom to prescribe with few restrictions, an in-
creased identification of the physician with drug prescribing could
conceivably bring an increased awareness of these problems to the
medical profession and facilitate improvements. 1 A presumption that
the doctor-patient relationship exists during the period when a pre-
scription drug is being used would more closely identify the physician
with this problem area.
A final argument in support of the presumption is related to
judicial convenience. Some of the cases discussed above demonstrate
the difficulty that courts have experienced in answering the question
of whether or not the doctor-patient relationship has been terminated.
A presumption that the relationship exists during the period when
prescription drugs are used would conceivably ease the burden of
answering this question.
In spite of the arguments discussed above, it would be unwise
to suggest that the taking of a prescription drug by a person would
extend the doctor-patient relationship as a matter of law. Such a
rule would fly in the face of the normal methods of termination such
as recovery, referral, withdrawal, and discharge; such a rule could
lead to the absurd result that a relationship exists even where a phy-
sician died while his patient continued to take the prescription drug;
such a rule would disregard the consensual nature of the relationship,
which some experts consider to be the critical factor. 2 A presumption
of the relationship, on the other hand, would allow the physician to
rebut by introducing other evidence that the relationship was termi-
nated, and would also be consistent with the view of the medical pro-
fession as to when a doctor-patient relationship exists."
'
t Bauer v. Bowen, 63 N.J. Super. 225, 164 A.2d 357 (1960); see Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 320,
383 (1961).
81 See Smith, supra note 25, at 1063.
82 R. Morris Interview, supra note 24, where he stated that the mental state of the parries is
the critical determining facor because of the consensual nature of the relationship. Morris
considered the existence of a prescription relevant as an indicator of their mental state.
'
3 Dr. Matulionis Interview, suPra note 18, where he stated that while a person is taking a
drug prescribed by a physician, 5o long as that person continues to follow the instructions
of the physician as to the drug and as to other matters, that person continues to be the pa-
tient of the physician unless some other obvious interruption in the doctor-patient relation-
ship takes place.
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Conclusion
The taking of a prescription drug should create a presumption
that the doctor-patient relationship is extended. The inherent dangers
in the use of prescription drugs give rise to an implicit moral or legal
responsibility on the part of the physician. Presumption of a con-
tinuing relationship is consistent with this continuing responsiblity.
The presumption is also consistent with the public policy of allowing
an injured party his day in court, but it does not encourage laches.
The presumption would more closely identify the whole area of drug
prescribing and use, with the medical profession, which is in the best
position to make or encourage improvements in the problem areas.
A presumption could still be rebutted by evidence that the relation-
ship had terminated in the typical manner of recovery, referral, with-
drawal, or discharge. However, where the evidence of termination
was weak, the existence of a presumption would assist the triers of
fact in determining whether the relationship had ended. Finally, a
presumption appears to be consistent with the view of medical-legal
experts and the medical profession as to when a doctor-patient re-
lationship exists.
Donald Uchtmannf
t Law Review Editor; third-year student, The Cleveland State University College of Law-
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